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ABSTRACT 
Over the last five years, America has placed an ever-increasing emphasis 
on missile defense and currently spends nearly $10 billion annually on its 
development.  The United States’ current missile Defense system is integrated; it 
depends on the cooperation of defensive elements aboard ships, on land, in the 
air and space.  The objective is to provide a layered defense with multiple 
opportunities to destroy an incoming missile.  By investing heavily in missile 
defense technology, the United States is clearly aiming to protect itself and its 
allies, but it is also attempting to deter its enemies and other terror regimes from 
spending their dollars on long-range missiles with the capabilities of hitting United 
States targets.  The underlying theory is that rogue regimes possess limited 
funds and will not invest precious dollars on weapons that will not be effective 
during an attack.  The United States believes its missile defense system is a 
deterrent to rogue states.  However, North Korea’s test launches in July 2006, 
along with subsequent testing of a nuclear device, illustrates that while the United 
States’ missile defense system may protect America from attacks, it may not be 
an effective deterrent to North Korea’s further missile development and future 
use in offensive action. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Without a doubt, North Korea is a thorn in America’s side and has been for 
decades.  Korea’s post-WWII division by the United States and the Soviet Union 
was never envisioned as a permanent fixture.  However, South Korea’s 
government, which was backed by the United States, and that of North Korea’s, 
led by the Soviet Union, were polar opposites.  The ensuing tension and 
instability quickly led to a civil war, most commonly referred to as the Korean 
War, and what seems to be a permanent division of the country with the South 
remaining an American ally and the North an adversary.  The relationship 
between the two divided countries, however, has benefited from South Korea’s 
adoption of the “sunshine policy” in 1998.  Accordingly, the South adheres to 
three basic principles in regards to the North: provocations from the North are not 
tolerated; cooperation regarding politics and economics are considered 
separately; and the South has no plans for invasion.1 
Since the Korean War’s close, the United States has kept a watchful eye 
on Pyongyang.  With the conclusion of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet 
Union, North Korea has become one of the most reclusive, dictatorial societies in 
the world.  By the late 1980s allegations against North Korea included threats 
against neighboring South Korea and Japan through kidnappings and border 
encroachment, as well as a disregard for international law and failure to adhere 
to treaties it signed.2  In addition to its other transgressions, the 1990s heralded 
North Korea’s expanded army and aggressive pursuit of advanced military 
weapons at the cost of their citizens’ welfare and country’s economic well-being.  
                                            
1 U.S. Department of State, Background Note: North Korea, Bureau of East Asia and Pacific 
Affairs.  [website]; April 2007; available from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm; Internet; 
accessed on 21 July 2007. 
2 The White House. [website]; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/; Internet; 
accessed on 16 July 2007. 
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At the turn of the century, North Korea’s increasing animosity towards the United 
States and everything for which it stands was evident.3   
After 11 September 2001, America’s tolerance for nation-states that fail to 
play by the rules of international law and justice has been pushed to the limit.  To 
the United States, North Korea represents the epitome of a rogue state and its 
feeling of disdain for America is reciprocated.  Moreover, President George W. 
Bush has refused to be complicit in maintaining the status quo between North 
Korea and the United States fostered by both the Reagan and Clinton 
administrations.  In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush clearly 
and unequivocally let the world know that North Korea, as a part of the “axis of 
evil”, was an enemy of the United States.  Further, “North Korea has become the 
world’s principal purveyor of ballistic missiles and has tested increasingly capable 
missiles while developing its own weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal”, 
and the United States must be prepared to deal with them accordingly. 
B. PROBLEM 
During the early years of the Cold War era, the United States chose to 
defend itself against attacks through a reliance on air and naval operations and a 
substantial body of ground forces stationed on the peninsula, but did not deploy a 
missile defense, even though there was a consistent research and development 
effort.  In 1972, the United States signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
severely restricting the further development of defensive missile systems.  With 
the end of the Cold War, and new nuclear threats from terrorists and countries 
such as North Korea and Iran, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty 
in 2001.   
Over the last five years, America has placed an ever-increasing emphasis 
on missile defense and currently spends nearly $10 billion annually on its 
                                            
3 The White House. [website]; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/; Internet; 
accessed on 16 July 2007. 
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development.4  The United States’ missile Defense system as currently 
envisioned is integrated; it depends on the cooperation of defensive elements 
aboard ships, on land, in the air and space.  The objective is to provide a layered 
defense with multiple opportunities to destroy an incoming missile.5  By investing 
heavily in missile defense technology, the United States is clearly aiming to 
protect itself and its allies, but it is also attempting to deter its enemies and other 
terror regimes from spending their dollars on long-range missiles with the 
capabilities of hitting United States targets.  The underlying theory is that rogue 
regimes possess limited funds and will not invest precious dollars on weapons 
that will not be effective during an attack.  The United States believes its missile 
defense system is a deterrent to rogue states.  However, North Korea’s test 
launches in July 2006, along with subsequent testing of a nuclear device, 
illustrates that while the United States’ missile defense system may protect 
America from attacks, it may not be an effective deterrent. 
North Korea has already shown that the United States missile defense 
system is not a deterrent to the development of missiles with varying range and 
capability levels. Over the weekend of 4 July 2006, North Korea successfully test 
fired six short and medium range missiles, respectively identified as Scud and 
Nodong missiles.  All of them had the capabilities of reaching Japan, which the 
United States considers an ally, and the United States has permanent military 
bases located in the country.  North Korea also fired the Taepodong-2, a long 
range missile with the capability of threatening the United States homeland.  
However, its test launch proved unsuccessful within moments of liftoff.  North 
Korea, though, was not deterred by this failure and on 9 October 2006, claimed 
to have successfully performed an underground nuclear test, which to this date 
has not been refuted by other global powers, including the United States.  
                                            
4 “The Taepondong Democrats,” Wall Street Journal, 21 July 2006, [journal online]; available 
from http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008687; Internet; accessed 15 
October 2007. 
5 “Missile Defense Test,” Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2006, [journal online]; available from 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008544; Internet; accessed 15 
October 2007. 
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The United States is aware that North Korea maintains an inventory of 
approximately 800 missiles, including 100-200 Nodongs and Taepodong-1s and 
an undisclosed number of Taepodong-2 missiles.6  North Korea is also 
developing a land-based mobile missile with the capability of reaching all of 
Japan.  Since 2003, when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty, the United States has held discussions with Pyongyang 
urging them to abandon their nuclear pursuits and to stop counterfeiting United 
States currency, among other issues.  The two countries reached an impasse in 
2005, and all talks were severed after the United States froze North Korean 
assets at a Chinese bank.7  Discussions between the two countries resumed a 
year later after North Korea test fired its intercontinental ballistic missiles, and the 
United States presumably realized its hard-line policy towards North Korea had 
not produce the desired results.8  The resulting six party negotiations led to a 
February 2007 agreement whereby North Korea would shut down and seal its 
known nuclear facilities in exchange for one million tons of oil.  For almost six 
months, the United States waited for North Korea to hold up its end of the 
bargain.  In July, North Korea informed the United States that their sole reactor 
had been turned off as agreed upon, which was verified by United Nations 
inspectors two days later.   
Critics of the Six Party Talks argue that the United States has been too 
accommodating toward North Korea.  They are, after-all, a rogue regime that has 
been a blip on America’s radar for decades.  The United States’ missile defense 
system does not appear to be a deterrent to the North Korean nuclear missile 
development.  While they have shut off their nuclear reactor, talks will resume 
                                            
6 Missile Defense Test,” Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2006, [journal online]; available from 
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110008544; Internet; accessed 15 
October 2007 
7 “N. Korea Shuts Reactor, Calls for End to Sanctions,” The Associated Press, 15 July 2007, 
[website]; available from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11989018; 
Internet; accessed on 29 July 2007.   
8 Mike Shuster, “North Korea Slows Pace of Nuclear Talks,” NPR, 30 March 2007, [website]; 
available from http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9237343; Internet; accessed 
on 29 July 2007.   
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regarding the destruction of their nuclear warheads in return for additional 
economic and political incentives.  Regardless, The United States is well aware 
that North Korea has a history of reneging on its promises since we have 
traveled down the disarmament path with them before.  Hence, the question 
becomes whether the United States’ missile defense system will deter North 
Korea from utilizing its missiles in offensive actions against the United States and 
its allies should North Korea withdraw from its recent agreement. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the United States’ Missile Defense 
Capabilities as a deterrent to the North Korean Missile Threat, several 
assumptions must be made and the tenuous “peace” shared by the United States 
and North Korea represents many which have been made on the part of America 
that are likewise reflected in this research undertaking.  First, North Korea poses 
substantial threat to the United States Forces in Korea and the allies in the 
Pacific region.  Second, North Korea was developing intercontinental ballistic 
missiles with the potential to reach the West Coast of the United States.  Third, 
the United States sees an end to nuclear proliferation in rogue states as vital to 
its interests, while North Korea values its nuclear program as leverage to attain 
goods and services from other nation-states.  Pyongyang pursues weapon 
technology, shows its products to the world, then agrees to dismantle – for a 
price; then the cycle is repeated with Pyongyang illustrating technological 
advances beyond expectation.  Lastly, previous diplomatic and economic 
sanctions against North Korea have been tantamount to cleaning a large wound 
with alcohol and failing to protect it with a band-aid – North Korea felt the burn, 
began to heal, but is willing to risk re-injury by renewing its weapons program.  
As reflected by their actions, it may be that North Korea has performed a risk 
analysis and determined more might be gained from their nuclear pursuits, or the 
appearance thereof, than lost.  Further, history has shown that the United States 
and other nation-states have repeatedly given humanitarian and economic aid to 
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North Korea in exchange for inspections of weapons facilities and promises to 
halt nuclear weapons productions.  Likewise, history has also shown that North 
Korea reneges on agreements after receiving the bargained for benefit.  Whether 
this is done as a tactical maneuver to renegotiate for better terms or as an 
attempt to gain the upper hand is unknown and need not be assumed.  It does 
naturally follow, however, that even though North Korea has once again agreed 
to stand-down, America’s distrust of North Korea continued adherence to agreed 
upon commitments must be assumed. 
The final set of assumptions relate to the interactions between the United 
States and North Korea.  Despite the United States’ designation of North Korea 
as a rogue state, it will be assumed that they will make reasoned decisions with 
foreseeable outcomes that further their goals, even though those goals may not 
fall in line with the presumptions of the rest of the international community.  
Meanwhile, it will be assumed that the United States can be relied upon to make 
rational decisions regarding North Korea that follow internationally accepted 
norms.  We must also assume that although North Korea boasts the fourth 
largest military force in the world, they do not desire to engage the United States 
in a ground war; if North Korea had such intentions, they would likely have 
utilized the troops situated at the demilitarized zone bordering North and South 
Korea and taken offensive action by now.  Equally as resistant to commit forces 
in a ground combat is the United States.  American troops readily available in the 
Pacific region have not been employed, or at the least, placed on alert for action.  
Rather, the United States recognizes that its leadership in the Global War on 
Terrorism has stretched the American troops thin, while the battle’s casualties 
accumulated in its pursuit have weakened the commitment of the country’s 
citizens.  Consequently, both sides have made their respective evaluations, and 
neither desires to lay their cards out on the table in the form of a ground war. 
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D. THESIS 
The impetus for this thesis is to determine whether the United States truly 
has the upper hand in its high stakes game with the North Korea.  The 
relationship between the United States and North Korea is clearly acrimonious, 
but the ability to maintain a tenuous “peace” hinges on their respective risk 
calculations of the other’s ability to effectively attack and/or defend.  The United 
States’ Missile Defense Capabilities will be limited to the PAC-3, THAAD, and 
Interceptor Missiles; while North Korea’s will be comprised of the Nodong, 
Taepondong-1, and Taepodong-2 missiles.  I will analyze the firepower, range, 
and readiness of the players’ missile capabilities.  Moreover, game theory will be 
employed to determine whether the United States has miscalculated a bet that 
could lead to nuclear disaster. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The ensuing chapters will evaluate the current missile defense capabilities 
of the United States and North Korea through application of the Systems 
Engineering and Design Process (SEDP).  System engineering ensures that the 
optimum system is developed as planned, operates as designed, and ultimately 
meets the identified goal of the organization, while balancing performance, cost, 
schedule and risk.  Ultimately, this blueprint assesses whether the North Korean 
Missile Threat is a bluff or the real deal; and if it’s real, can the United States truly 
defend itself or are we simply wearing a poker face? 
Further analysis contains an analysis of the current missile defense 
situation on the Korean Peninsula by utilizing Game Theory.  Game Theory, a 
branch of applied mathematics and economics, is the mathematical study of 
human interactions described by rules of play and alternative choices.9   
                                            
9 David Levine, “What is Game Theory,” [website]; available from 
http://www.dklevine.com/general/whatis.htm; Internet; accessed 17 March 2007. 
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The formal modeling approach utilized in non-cooperative game theory replicates 
a social situation by specifying the options, incentives, and information of the 
players in an attempt to determine the actions each will make to maximize their 
returns.  This will provide a clearer picture of the political situation in which North 
Korea and the United States have become embroiled. 
Relevant to this thesis is also empirical literature.  The work of Korean 
scholars will provide in-depth knowledge of the decision making process of the 
current regime in North Korea.  American articles and federal government 
documents will be relied upon to ascertain the United States’ deterrence policy.  
In addition, special attention will be given to the historical lessons of the United 
States’ deterrence policy during the Cold War. 
The effect of this assessment is intended to prevent the United States 
from underestimating the North Korean Missile Threat.  All of the nation’s 
superpowers would agree that the decision to go to war is not to be made lightly, 
but the decision not to engage in combat operations should undergo meticulously 
careful considerations as well. 
 9 
II. NEEDS ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEMS AND ENGINEERING DESIGN 
PROCESS 
Decision-makers throughout the world realize the value of utilizing an 
identified methodology in the creation of designs/systems.  The Systems 
Engineering and Design Process (SEDP) appears to be particularly conducive in 
addressing the large-scale, complex problem of the North Korean Peninsula 
confronting the United States Military.  The SEDP’s basic framework begins with 
problem and stakeholder identification and analysis, followed by brainstorming 
and analysis of solutions, and concluding with a final selection and 
implementation.  When used correctly, the four phases of the SEDP ensure the 
created system solves the identified problem.  Accordingly, a successful outcome 
hinges on the proper assessment of the problem an organization faces; if the 
problem is not defined correctly, the resulting system will almost always be a 
failure.  Assuming, therefore, that the United States has correctly utilized the 
Design and Analysis, Decision Making, and Implementation phases of the SEDP, 
this analysis needs only to focus on the initial phase – Problem Definition – to 
determine whether the United States has wasted valuable time, expended 
human energy, and squandered billions of dollars creating a great solution for the 
wrong problem. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The Problem Definition phase of the SEDP is usually initiated when the 
reality of a situation differs from how one party envisions it should be.  In the 
case of the North Korean Missile threat, the United States realizes North Korea’s 
nuclear weapon and intercontinental ballistic missile pursuits pose a danger to 
homeland security and Asian/Pacific allies.  Further, the United States believes 
its safety from North Korean offensive action rests upon the dismantling of 
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Pyongyang’s missile program.  Even though the United States has pumped more 
than 15 billion dollars into its own missile defense system, it has failed to deter 
North Korea’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.  Additionally, the United 
States has continuously refrained from initiating military action, instead opting to 
take a more diplomatic approach.  A recent example of American diplomacy 
occurred in response to North Korea’s latest display of “war games”; the United 
States led the Six Party Talks that culminated in the 2007 agreement whereby 
North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear reactors, both known and unknown, 
as well as dismantle its ballistic missile weapons program.  In exchange for their 
cooperation, North Korea was promised humanitarian, economic, and energy 
assistance, in addition to the removal of their country from the United States’ list 
of countries that sponsor terrorism.10  To this date, all parties to the Six Party 
Talks have performed in accordance to its resolutions.   
North Korea has made and broken promises regarding its weapons 
program for decades, and therefore, despite the agreement reached by the Six 
Party Talks, the United States has continued to fund the development of its 
missile defense system.  These actions are fully in line with the SEDP, which 
suggests that the United States explore its identified need of extinguishing North 
Korea’s weapons program by performing a Needs Analysis. The Needs Analysis 
process creates the effective needs statement from an early, primitive, identified 
need.  The effective needs statement recognizes there may be multiple courses 
of actions available to resolve a given problem.  The first step toward developing 
the effective needs statement is to perform a comprehensive study of the 
perceived threat. 
C. THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE THREAT 
An unpredictable regime that refuses to conform to international standards 
of diplomacy, humanity, and military operations is more than enough reason for 
                                            
10 U.S. Department of State, [website] February 2007, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/february/80479.htm accessed on 27 July 2007.  
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the United States to maintain a watchful eye on North Korea.  In the fall of 2002, 
the United States confronted North Korea when satellites showed that they 
possessed what was possibly an underground nuclear weapons complex.  
Pyongyang admitted to having a secret nuclear program based on highly 
enriched uranium and expelled International Atomic Energy Agency officials, 
prohibiting them from further facility inspections.11  Additional claims of ballistic 
missiles, some alleged to be intercontinental, with chemical and possibly 
biological and nuclear payloads has made the United States’ outlook on 
Pyongyang change from one of guarded suspicion to one of probable threat.  
Moreover, public criticism by the United States and a move to cease all heavy oil 
shipments to North Korea effectively ended all pretense of civility between the 
two countries.12   
Since 2002, the United States has not wavered in its resolve that North 
Korea cease its nuclear program.  North Korea, however, accused the United 
States of planning a “preemptive nuclear attack” against it and has not only 
withdrawn from its moratorium on missile testing but also moved ahead with its 
weapons program at full speed.13  Due to the communist country’s isolation, 
Washington’s intelligence is not clear on the exact status of North Korea’s 
nuclear program or missile capabilities.  The United States had long been aware 
of a program employing plutonium, which makes compact weapons but requires 
large, easily detected reactors, and witnessed an example of the progress North 
Korea has made in this area in October 2006 when its first nuclear device was 
                                            
11 Larry A. Niksch,  North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33590, Updated 3 January 2007. 
12 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Had doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive,” 
The New York Times, 1March 2007. [Website], available from 
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13 Larry A. Niksch,  North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress RL33590, Updated 3 January 2007. 
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tested by the rogue country.14  As unsettling as this appears, coming on the 
heels of North Korea’s ballistic missile tests of July 2006, the United States has 
yet another concern regarding Pyongyang’s suspected highly enriched uranium 
program (HEU).  In contrast to plutonium, uranium creates larger warheads but 
the technology for enriching uranium is smaller and therefore easier to hide.15  
While the United States initially believed the HEU program to be highly efficient, it 
has most recently relaxed its stance on how quickly North Korea could produce 
an atom bomb utilizing uranium.  Once again, the lack of credible, precise 
intelligence on North Korea’s weapons programs is illustrated, and the United 
States is provided with further reason to consider the reality of North Korea’s 
threat.  The following represents a best estimate of the missile capabilities and 
inventory of North Korea’s Nodong, Taepodong I, and Taepodong II missiles. 
 1. North Korean Missile Systems 
a. Nodong 
The United States’ reports of North Korea’s development of a 
purported 1,000 to 1,300 kilometer-range missile called the Nodong began in the 
early 1990’s.16  This was of particular significance due to the proximity of North 
Korea to South Korea and Japan, which would be easy targets for the Nodong.  
The Nodong was the product of more than 20 years of experience gained by 
North Korea through their Scud missile design, development, and testing.17  
                                            
14 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Had doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive,” 
The New York Times, 1March 2007. [Website], available from 
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15 Ibid. 
16 David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshevb, “An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile,” 
Science and Global Security, April 1994 [journal online]; available from 
www.caep.cetin.net.cn/jk/pdf/4_2wright.pdf; Internet; accessed on 15 August 2007. 
17 Joseph A. Bermudez, “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, Occasional 
Paper No. 2,” Monterey Institute of International Studies Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
1999, [website]; available from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf; Internet; accessed 
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When North Korea’s initial launch of the Nodong was only 500 kilometers across 
the Sea of Japan (heading toward Japan) in May 1993 a number of analysts 
speculated that the test was designed for the Nodong’s evaluation by potential 
buyers.18  Others viewed the test as a tactical show of defiance by the North 
Koreans in the face of pressure concerning their nuclear arms pursuits. 
Since 1993, more has been discovered about the Nodong’s actual 
capabilities.  United States intelligence has shown that North Korea’s current 
Nodong reached full deployment capability in the late 1990s.  It has a single 
stage, liquid-fueled engine that can carry either a high explosive or chemical 
warhead payload of 800 – 1,000 kilograms with a range of approximately 1,300 
kilometers.19  Although North Korea has not demonstrated the capability to 
deliver nuclear weapons with the Nodong, this possibility must be carefully 
considered.  Moreover, North Korea has reportedly deployed more than 100 of 
these medium range ballistic missiles to Iran and Pakistan, while maintaining its 
own inventory of an estimated 200 Nodong’s, all of which are capable of 
targeting South Korea and most of Japan, where the United States maintains 
military bases.20 
b. Taepodong I 
The Taepodong I is a modified version of the Nodong missile and is 
often referred to as Nodong II.  Very little was known about North Korea’s 
Taepodong program until it launched the Taepodong I on 31 August 1998.21  It is 
now believed that initial production for the missile began as early as 1997 with 
                                            
18 David C. Wright and Timur Kadyshevb, “An Analysis of the North Korean Nodong Missile,” 
Science and Global Security, April 1994 [journal online]; available from 
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20 Ibid.  
21 Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: Order Code RS21473, updated 25 July 
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prototypes having been created approximately two years earlier.  The missile 
utilizes a Nodong-type missile for its first stage, followed by North Korea’s proven 
Scud missile technology for the second stage to achieve an estimated 2,000-
kilometer range.  The 1998 launch, surprisingly, included a third stage, believed 
to be an attempt to place a satellite into orbit, which failed, but did extend the 
range of the Taepodong I by 800 kilometers.  After the launch, some analysts 
postulated that a properly functioning missile could attain a 3,800 – 5,900 
kilometer range with a 700 – 1, 000 kilogram payload, able to reach Japan, 
Okinawa, and Guam.22  As with the Nodong, the Taepodong I uses liquid fuel 
and has not been fitted with a nuclear payload, yet it appears possible.  
Moreover, while the Taepodong I is unable to reach the continental United 
States, this intermediate range ballistic missile is capable of striking the sites of 
major United States military bases.  Intelligence analysts estimate North Korea to 
have produced no more than 10 Taepodong I missiles by the end of 1999, and 
no reliable source exits as to their current numbers.23 
c. Taepodong II 
Although the United States was aware the Taepodong II was in 
production as early as 2003, the missile had not been tested by North Korea until 
the recent July 2007 launches.  North Korea hailed the test launch a success, 
while the United States deemed it a failure since the missile fell into the Sea of 
Japan of its own accord after a 40 second flight.  Nevertheless, the United States 
estimates that an operational, two-stage Taepodong II with an estimated range of 
6,700 kilometers could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of the western 
continental United States, while delivering a 700 – 1,000 kilogram payload, and 
moreover, a three-stage Taepodong II could strike all of the United States with 
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similar capabilities.24  Given the failed launch, however, it is unlikely that North 
Korea would be able to deliver such payloads with any level of accuracy for 
several years to come.25  The threat that the rogue nation could attempt such an 
offensive puts the United States at risk, especially since the launch indicates 
North Korea has made rapid technological strides with its Nodong missile, a 
derivative of which comprises the Taepodong II.26  
D. STAKEHOLDERS ANALYSIS 
The Stakeholders Analysis represents one of three primary tools utilized in 
the Needs Analysis to develop the effective needs statement.  The Stakeholders 
Analysis identifies organizational players relevant to the problem and determines 
their needs, wants and desires, and responsibilities in its regard; it allows the 
organization to assess all parties that may provide assistance in solving their 
problem.  While it is safe to assume that Americans in general desire to be 
secure from attacks by rogue nations, the United States Department of Defense 
DOD maintains overall responsibility for protecting American citizens and 
infrastructure from organized attacks.  Its primary mission is to provide the 
military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of the United States, 
and in the furtherance of this goal DOD has charged several governmental 
agencies with the planning and implementation of its objectives.27  The following 
represents the key stakeholders within the DOD and identifies their roles, 
interests, and priorities in maintaining a safe and secure United States. 
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25 Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies,  “Special 
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26 Ibid.   
27 U. S. Department of Defense, [website]; available from www.defenselink.mil; Internet; 
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 1. Agencies 
a. NORTHCOM 
United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) was established 
in 2002 to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and 
to coordinate defense support of civil authorities.28  NORTHCOM plans, 
organizes, and executes homeland defense operations to deter, prevent, and 
defeat threats and aggression from enemies.  It must anticipate and protect the 
air, land, and sea approaches to the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, 
and Mexico.29  Given that NORTHCOM maintains very few permanent military 
forces, it is assigned forces at the request of the President of the United States or 
Secretary of Defense as needed to execute missions. 
b.   NORAD 
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a 
cooperative organization between the United States and Canada responsible for 
North American aerospace warning and control.  To accomplish the aerospace 
warning mission, NORAD monitors man-made objects via satellites to detect, 
validate, and present an Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment to 
both governments.30   The satellites must be capable of distinguishing between a 
hostile aircraft, missile, or space vehicle.  Aerospace control ensures air 
sovereignty through the defense of Canadian and United States airspace by 
utilizing air-based radar and fighters to detect, intercept, and, when necessary, 
engage any threat. 
                                            
28 U.S. Northern Command, [website]; available from www.northcom.mil; Internet; accessed 
on 20 August 2007. 
29 Ibid.   
30 North American Aerospace Defense Command, [website]; available from www.norad.mil; 
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c.   JTAMDO 
Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) is 
the management structure initiated by the DOD in 1997 to provide the joint forces 
commanders an improved capability to defend against air and missile threats.  It 
is chartered to plan, coordinate, and oversee Joint Air and Missile Defense 
requirements, joint operational concepts, operational architectures, and 
development of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense roadmap.31  
JTAMDO is responsible for evaluating systems and emerging technologies in 
order to determine air and missile defense capabilities and deficiencies, as well 
as to improve weapon system performance.  Through analysis, simulations, and 
demonstrations, JTAMDO determines the optimum mix of surveillance, fire 
control, and battle management to counter aircraft, cruise missile, and ballistic 
missile threats.32 
d.   MDA 
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) has as its mission to develop, 
test and prepare an integrated ballistic missile defense system.  The designed 
system, only part of which maintains a static location, provides a multi-layered 
defense for the United States, deployed forces, and allies against ballistic 
missiles of all ranges in all phases of flight.33  To accomplish its goal, MDA 
employs complimentary land, sea, air, and space-based interceptors in its hit-to-
kill technology.34  Ultimately, MDA is committed to a kinetic kill-based technology 
for interception. 
                                            
31 JOINT STAFF FY 2006/2007 Budget Estimates Research, Development, Test, and 
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32 Ibid. 
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e.   SMDC/ARSTRAT 
The United States Army Space and Missile Defense Command 
(SMDC) became SMDC/ARSTRAT when the United States Army Forces 
Strategic Command was created in 2003.  With this change came greater 
responsibility, and SMDC/ARSTRAT has necessarily assumed new missions that 
include planning and integrating Army capabilities for Global Strike, Information 
Operations and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.35  However, its primary focus remains its role 
as the proponent for space and ground-based midcourse defense.36 
f.   PACOM 
United States Pacific Command holds responsibility for promoting 
security and peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region by deterring 
aggression, advancing regional security cooperation, responding to crisis, and 
when required, fighting to win.37  In addition to fighting the Global War on 
Terrorism, other major focus areas of PACOM include working with allies to 
strengthen relationships and conditions for regional security and prosperity, as 
well as ensuring operational plans are current and realistic, utilizing plausible 
assumptions and executable operational phases that are militarily winnable.38 
Support for PACOM is provided by the 94th Army Air and Missile 
Defense Command (94th AAMDC), which is located at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.  The 
94th AAMDC conducts Joint and Combined Theater Air and Missile Defense 
according to PACOM operational plans and contingency operations.39  Moreover, 
                                            
35 U.S.  Army Space and Missile Defense Command, [website]; available from 
www.smdc.army.mil; Internet; accessed on 20 August 2007. 
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the 94th AAMDC serves as the joint integrator, synchronizing Joint Theater Air 
and Missile Defense Operations among the four United States Armed Services.40 
E. CONCLUSION 
The challenge North Korea brings to the peace and security of the United 
States and its interests and allies on the North Korean Peninsula cannot be 
denied.  Particularly, in the wake of September 11, 2001, The United States has 
made threat assessments across the board in an effort to maintain cognizance of 
terrorist organizations as well as rogue nations.  On the military front, the DOD 
holds ultimate responsibility for anticipating, thwarting, and if necessary, 
defending attacks against the United States, and they have charged several 
governmental agencies as key stakeholders to assure success in this mission.  
North Korea’s current agreement per the Six Party Talks has failed to diminish 
the very real threat North Korea’s missile arsenal could constitute to the United 
States at home and abroad.  Consequently, the focus on aerial surveillance, 
intelligence operations, fire control, and everything else that is missile defense 
illustrates Washington’s distrust of North Korea and rogue nations like them.   
In accordance with the SEDP’s Needs Analysis, the United States’ early, 
primitive identified need of dismantling North Korea’s ballistic missile program 
has been thoroughly evaluated in light of the North Korean Missile Threat.  The 
United States also looked at its agencies to determine their possible role and 
capabilities in protecting against incoming missiles.  Consequently, an effective 
needs statement consisting of dismantling North Korea’s program, but also 
deterring an offensive, and, if necessary, protecting our interests at home and 
abroad was developed.  This statement identifies what is needed to solve the 
problem of the North Korean Missile Threat, and thereby keep the United States 
and its interests safe. 
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III. CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE ANALYSIS AGAINST NORTH 
KOREAN MISSILE THREAT 
The Needs Analysis in Chapter II rendered an effective needs statement 
as follows:  To keep America safe from air attacks by North Korea, we must 
develop a system that will deter the development and/or use of ballistic missiles 
against the United States at home and its allies abroad, as well as ensuring the 
operational capabilities of the designed system to protect the same if it fails to act 
as a deterrent.  In this chapter, the SEDP’s Value System Analysis, which 
represents the final step of the process, will be utilized to determine whether the 
system designed by the United States meets its specified need.  Clearly, the 
historic post-WWII system did not deter North Korea from their intercontinental 
ballistic missile (ICBM) pursuits as evidenced by their withdrawal from the NPT 
and the technological advances seen in their ballistic missiles during the 2007 
test launches.  Hence the deterrence issue, as previously stated in Chapter I, is 
whether or not the United States’ system will deter the rogue country from once 
again reneging on its agreement to cease their weapons pursuits in a first step 
toward launching an attack against the United States.  To be clear, though, the 
following analysis will not determine whether the current system will in fact obtain 
its objective (for the likelihood of this occurrence is accomplished in the next 
chapter), but is instead limited to the feasibility of the designed ballistic missile 
system to perform its desired function – whether the system is capable of 
deterring and protecting.  
A. DETER THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE THREAT 
Since the close of the Cold War, North Korea, as an unpredictable 
adversary of the United States, has arguably been the closest country to 
attaining the technology required to develop an ICBM with capabilities of 
reaching United States targets.  As discussed earlier, missile defense was largely 
ignored prior to the 1990’s.  For nearly forty years, except for attack warning and 
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attack assessment, the United States’ defense against nuclear warheads 
launched by ballistic missiles or from space was nonexistent, and defenses 
against cruise missiles was rudimentary at best.41  (Essentially, a cruise missile 
is a flying bomb because it has wings and uses a propulsion mechanism similar 
to an airplane.)  Over the last decade, though, missile defense has become 
among the cornerstones for the modernization of today’s military.  Suffice it to 
state, the Ground-Based Missile Defense System we have today was in fact 
spurred by the North Korean Missile Threat.  President Reagan’s vision of 
deterrence against the Soviet Union Missile Threat was based on increased 
defensive systems and a reduced numbers of nuclear missiles, for missile 
defense was believed to be less expensive than ballistic missile proliferation and 
just as effective in protecting against the threat.42   It was President Clinton, 
though, that made the first formal adjustment in presidential policy with an 
emphasis on deterring nuclear weapons, not fighting them.43  The Clinton 
Administration recognized the need for missile defense and, accordingly, 
provided funding for research but the Administration of President George W. 
Bush has truly shepherded the transformation of what was formerly known as the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Program into its current configuration as the National 
Missile Defense System.44 
Using the 11 September 2001, terror attacks as evidence of the changing 
threats faced by the United States, the Bush Administration pushed an agenda to 
alter America’s approach to deterrence and arms control.45  Accordingly, the 
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national security policy shifted from one of deterrence based solely on the threat 
of nuclear retaliation to an increased emphasis on reducing the incentive for 
proliferation and use of ballistic missiles by deploying a formidable defense 
system as well.  As for the inevitable strain that the boost in United States missile 
technology and proliferation has caused with former enemies, such as the Soviet 
Union and China, the Bush Administration has often asserted that, “missile 
defenses threaten no one, except those who would threaten the United States.”46  
Consequently, the American defense system has continued to receive increases 
in funding, catapulting a decades old defense system into an integrated, multi-
layered schematic. 
B. PROTECT AGAINST A NORTH KOREAN OFFENSIVE 
Initially, against an adversary firing many offensive missiles, it was not 
believed that the missile defense system needed to be perfect; it was thought 
that even an imperfect defense could raise enough doubt in an adversary’s mind 
to discourage an attack.47  With the end of the Cold War and the prospect of less 
predictable adversaries with far fewer missiles, the concept of a “quality defense”  
– a system capable of completely thwarting a limited attack – became much 
more attractive.  In December 2002, the Department of Defense was ordered by 
President George W. Bush, to begin fielding a capability that will protect our 
homeland, deployed forces, and our friends and allies from ballistic missile 
attack.48  Two years and billions of dollars later, the MDA revealed a missile 
defense system hailed as being both operational and technologically superior.  
 The single layered defense system is designed to address the three 
phases of a ballistic missile’s trajectory: boost, midcourse, and terminal.  Boost 
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phase is the portion of the missile’s flight occurring immediately after launch.  
Acceleration occurs under power to lift the payload into near space and only lasts 
for 3-5 minutes.49  This phase represents the most ideal time for the threatening 
missile to be intercepted.  The missile is easiest to detect because it is still intact 
and emits a bright and hot exhaust.  Moreover, intercept in the boost phase 
would allow any falling debris to land in the territory of the launching country, 
keeping America and its friends safe from ancillary damage.  The midcourse 
phase is the longest in the missile’s trajectory, lasting up to 20 minutes.  It begins 
when the booster rocket separates from the missile payload, allowing the missile 
to coast unpowered through space on the path to its target.50  The length of the 
phase allows multiple intercept attempts to be made, and any falling debris 
should burn off as it reenters the earth’s atmosphere.  The terminal phase is not 
only the last phase of the missile’s flight, but also represents the last opportunity 
to destroy the incoming threat.  It occurs when the missile’s warhead, most likely 
equipped with a chemical or nuclear payload, reenters the earth’s atmosphere 
and is propelled under the force of gravity to its target.  Given that this phase 
lasts only 30 - 60 seconds, it is the least desirable time to intercept a missile, yet 
much attention has been afforded to this phase of intercept since it is the last line 
of defense.51 
 MDA recognized that a superior missile system must not only address the 
phases of an incoming missile’s trajectory, but that it must also provide for its 
varying distance capabilities.  Ballistic missiles are classified according to their 
range; short-range is from 150 – 800 Kilometers, medium-range is from 800 – 
2,399 kilometers, intermediate-range is from 2,400 – 5,499 kilometers, and 
intercontinental-range is 5, 500 and greater.52  In regards to the threat posed 
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from North Korean ballistic missiles, the Nodong is medium range, the 
Taepodong I is intermediate range, and the Taepodong II is an intercontinental 
range ballistic missile.  Accordingly, the United States maintains different missile 
capabilities for a long-range, medium-, and short-range missile shield.  The 
overall system designed by MDA meets the advanced technology of the ballistic 
missile’s varying ranges, while giving consideration to the trajectory stage in 
which the intercept will occur.    Further, the system is integrated, utilizing all 
branches of the armed forces as well as the expertise of several DOD agencies 
to survey the airspace, collect data, and transmit intelligence regarding 
suspicious military activities.   
C. THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM 
Ballistic missile defense is the detection, tracking, engagement, and 
destruction of ballistic missiles at some point in their trajectory before the 
warhead is detonated at its target.53  Known as the National Missile Defense 
System, the current United States configuration first determines the range 
capability of the incoming missile and then launches a compatible, intercepting 
missile aimed at targeting the threat based on its phase of flight.   The highly 
advanced system maintains components at sea, in the air and space, and on the 
ground to keep America safe from rogue countries with ballistic missiles.  
Ground-Based Interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Terminal 
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) are three components of the integrated 
defense system; together, they form the basis of the United States’ ground-based 
missile defense and represent the primary deterrent to and protection from the 
North Korean Missile Threat. 
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 1. Ground-Based Interceptors 
The United States successfully carried out its seventh intercept using 
Ground-Based Interceptors on 28 September 2007.  Interceptors are a 
component of Washington’s long-range missile defense shield.  The nine 
interceptors at Ft. Greely, Alaska and two at Vandenberg Air Force Base in 
California were installed by the MDA in 2004 for the express purpose of taking 
out intercontinental ballistic missiles fired from North Korea.54   
The interceptors, which can be brought to alert status in an emergency but 
are not yet on 24 hour alert, use a three boost phase motor and is designed to 
intercept long-range missiles along their trajectory during the mid-course 
phase.55  It also uses the groundbreaking hit-to-kill technology rather than the 
historic exploding warhead.  Consequently, there is little room for error since the 
defending bullet must collide with the North Korean warhead to stop its deadly 
mission.  As previously stated, however, the mid-course phase is the longest in 
the missile’s trajectory and allows several opportunities for an intercept to occur.   
Despite its recent successful intercept, critics regard Ground-Based Interceptors 
as an unproven system, having knocked down only six of the last 10 targets in 
intercepts tests since October 1999.56  Nevertheless, MDA’s belief in the 
system’s operational capabilities is illustrated by their plan to spend four billion 
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dollars developing ten, two-boost phase Interceptors (for short and medium-
range threats) for installation in Poland to counter the anticipated Iranian threat.57 
 2. PAC-3 
The hit-to-kill PAC-3 missile has been heralded as the world’s most 
advanced, capable, and powerful terminal air defense missile.  Its advanced 
technology warhead was the first to defeat incoming targets with direct body-to-
body impact, a system which forms the basis of all modern missile defenses.58 
Further, no other missile system defeats all airspace threats – ballistic missiles, 
cruise missiles, and aircraft.59  The PAC-3’s long-range missile defense proved 
100 percent accurate and successful in Operation Iraqi Freedom, providing 
deployed forces and valued assets with protection during the under-a-minute, 
final phase of both medium and long-range missile threats. 
The PAC-3 builds on its PAC-2 predecessor’s air and missile defense 
infrastructure by transforming the old system with Lockheed Martin’s PAC-3 
Missile Segment upgrade.  The PAC-3 is a single design unit that fires its         
hit-to-kill missile from a mobile launcher station, which can carry 16 PAC-3 
missiles.  The PAC-3 missile uses a solid propellant rocket motor with altitude 
control and inertial guidance to navigate toward its target at an intercept point 
that is specified prior to launch by a computer in its ground-based, engagement 
control station.60  Given that the PAC-3 interceptor kills the incoming missile 
during the terminal phase of its trajectory, accuracy is key.  Consequently, the 
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target’s projected path can be updated to the kill vehicle during its flight by a 
radio frequency uplink/downlink.61  Further advances in the PAC-3’s technology 
are illustrated by the missiles on board radar that acquires the target and selects 
the optimal aim point to initiate terminal guidance shortly before arrival at the 
intercept point.62 
The exact number of PAC-3 missile systems has not been released, but 
initial production allowed for the upgrading of three launchers per Patriot Battery, 
making their number total 16 (which is almost ½ of all Army Patriot launcher 
stations).63  The Army recently awarded a contract worth more than $375 million 
dollars to Lockheed Martin for the production of 112 PAC-3 missiles, including 
launcher upgrade equipment and software.64  This new contract comes on the 
heels of Lockheed Martin’s delivery of the 500th PAC-3 missile to the Army. 
 3. THAAD 
THAAD represents the link between Ground-Based Interceptors and PAC-
3 missile systems.  It is designed to intercept short-, medium-, and intermediate-
range ballistic missiles that could threaten the United States, allies, and deployed 
forces.65  Keeping in line with the vision of a multi-layered missile defense, 
THAAD missiles intercept at a higher altitude than PAC-3 within the terminal 
phase of an incoming missile’s trajectory, as well as possessing the capability to 
intercept in the latter portion of the midcourse phase, which is the domain of 
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Ground-Based Interceptors.  Additionally, the THAAD components are mobile; 
the launcher is truck mounted, and the radar is the largest, air-transportable one 
of its kind in the world.66  THAAD also collides with missiles to destroy them, 
using the advanced hit-to-kill technology common to the aforementioned 
systems, as well as the PAC-3’s on board missile technology to complete its 
missile defense capability. 
THAAD entered the prototype manufacturing phase of production in 2000 
and flight testing began in 2005.  At the time of North Korea’s test launch in July 
2007, the THAAD system had failed to intercept its target in a test in May 2006.  
In January 2007, however, THAAD underwent another missile intercept test that 
was a success, and with only a 50/50 record, the United States once again 
displayed faith in its missile defense system and awarded Lockheed Martin a 
$619 million dollar contract for the production of the first two THAAD systems, 
which includes launchers, radars, intercept missiles, and operation centers.67  
Since then, THAAD successfully intercepted another target in April 2007, and the 
Army released that it expects to acquire 80 to 99 THAAD launchers, 18 ground-
based radars and a total of 1,422 THAAD missiles.68 
D. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether or not the missile defense system designed by 
the United States to neutralize the North Korean Missile Threat actually performs 
as planned is determined by the Value System Analysis of the SEDP.  A 
comprehensive study of the situation on the peninsula was performed and the 
Needs Analysis identified what the United States should do.  Consequently, a 
rudimentary missile defense was catapulted into a state of the art, highly 
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advanced system designed to deter attacks by rogue countries with ballistic 
missiles and to protect the United States, its allies, deployed forces, and valued 
assets throughout the world from the same threat.   
The policy of deterrence is in itself a risk calculation, and the job of 
protection is about the perception of capability; the United States has spent 
billions of dollars playing a high stakes game.  The high cost of the National 
Missile Defense System’s ground-based components did not convince North 
Korea that their resources would be wasted on the proliferation of ballistic 
missiles.  Yet, Pyongyang’s willingness to stand-down and dismantle its weapons 
program may be an acknowledgement of the operational capabilities of the 
United States’ Ground-based Interceptors, PAC-3, and THAAD.  Further, now 
that all three systems have proven successful in test intercepts, and the PAC-3 
has also proved to be 100 percent effective in battle, the Value System Analysis 
indicates that the designed system is capable of deterring North Korea from 
breaking promises made during the Six Party Talks to reinstitute their weapons 
program in order to launch offensive action against the United States.  Moreover, 
Value System Analysis illustrates that the ground-based component of the NMD 
System is fully capable of protecting against a North Korean ballistic missile if the 
rogue country is foolish enough to launch an attack it is unlikely to complete. 
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IV. MODELING ANALYSIS 
The Value System Analysis illustrates that the missile defense system 
designed by the United States is capable of deterring North Korea from reneging 
on promises made in the Six Party Talks by resuming their weapons program 
and launching an attack.  The analysis further demonstrated that if North Korea 
failed to be deterred, the Ground-Based Interceptors, PAC-3, and THAAD all 
possess the capability of defending the United States and its allies abroad.  As 
stated previously, North Korea has begun dismantling its nuclear facilities but has 
reneged on similar agreements in the past.  Consequently, the United States has 
elected to continue development of its layered missile defense capability in order 
to detect, engage, and destroy long-range ballistic missiles despite the 
agreement reached in the Six Party Talks in an effort to defuse the threat on the 
North Korean Peninsula.  There is, however, another analysis to be performed; in 
this chapter Game Theory will be utilized to determine if the U.S. truly has the 
upper hand in this high stakes game of ballistic missiles.   
A. DEFINING THE GAME 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics and provides a formal 
modeling approach to social situations in which decision makers interact with 
opposing agents, choosing strategies to maximize their return while taking into 
consideration the opposition’s strategies as well.69  The game will be played 
simultaneously, employing a competitive strategy for each player with no 
opportunities for the United States and North Korea to cooperate.  The gaming 
matrix will be formulated, as modeled in Philip Straffin’s Game Theory and 
Strategy, as a non-zero sum, two-person game, and moreover, the matrix will 
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result in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.70    A non-zero-sum game is one in which the 
sum of the payoffs for the two players under any strategy combination is greater 
or less than zero; that is a win by one player does not necessarily equate to a 
loss by the other.71  Thus, Game Theory provides a basis for both North Korea 
and the United States to decide what strategy to utilize because it predicts the 
outcome of the political situation on the Peninsula based on the course of action 
each party takes. 
B. QUESTION TO BE ANALYZED 
As the United States continues to develop a robust missile defense 
capability to protect valued assets and interests at home and abroad, will the 
system, in fact, deter North Korea from breaking their promise to cease the 
proliferation of ballistic missiles (with a chemical or nuclear warhead)? 
C. THE PLAYERS 
North Korea is not known for its trustworthiness; the rogue country has 
historically gone against the grain of international conduct, then entered into an 
agreement to reform its behavior in exchange for economic benefit, only to later 
renege on the agreement and reenter negotiations for additional gain.  North 
Korea determines what makes a country tick – in this case, ballistic missiles – 
and forges ahead with antagonizing behavior.  Given this scenario, Pyongyang 
knows its ballistic missile pursuits are a cause of serious concern for the United 
States and has benefited once again, via the Six Party Talks, from its 2006 public 
display of missile technology.  After calculating the risks, North Korea must 
decide whether to abide by its agreement to accept aid and cease further 
weapons of mass destruction proliferation, or simulate cooperation in order to 
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attain additional economic and humanitarian aid at a later date, during another 
round of negotiations, or perform the unthinkable by launching an attack.   
The United States can continue rapid development and heavy funding of 
its layered missile defense capability in order to detect, engage, and destroy 
long-range ballistic missiles.  By doing this in spite of the agreement reached with 
North Korea in the Six Party Talks, the United States is operating under the 
assumption that history will repeat itself, and North Korea will renege.  It naturally 
follows that if the rogue country reneges, the United States must ensure that its 
missile defense capability is credible enough to dissuade North Korea from 
attempting offensive action.  However, the United States may also assume that a 
fully operational missile defense system, such as the one it developed, may act 
as a deterrent to North Korea’s weapons pursuits because it would be an 
exercise in futility, not to mention a grand expenditure that the country would be 
better investing elsewhere. 
D. PLAYERS’ STRATEGIES 
The following Strategy Matrix depicts the rankings given to both players’ 
respective strategies based on their intersecting outcomes.  The matrix has been 
assigned a scale of 1 to 4, with 4 being the most preferred strategy a player 
would select and 1 being the least preferred strategy.  Again, neither player is 
afforded the benefit of knowing the strategy employed by the other player 
because both play at the same time.  As illustrated below in Figure 1, each player 




Figure 1.   Strategic Choice Matrix 
 
 
 1. Player I – United States’ Strategies 
 a. An integrated, layered missile defense system.  The design allows 
air, sea, and land based defense systems to intercept threats in every phase of 
the incoming missile’s trajectory, therefore providing a mobile and global security 
system.  Moreover, the operational capability of the National Missile Defense 
System could undermine North Korea’s confidence and, therefore, its willingness 
to attempt to impose widespread destruction on the United States and its allies 
by means of missile delivery.72  The United States can benefit from continuing to 
develop, test, and improve its missile defense system. 
 b. Diplomacy.  Current U.S. policy involves utilizing diplomatic means 
to maintain a stable military environment on the Peninsula while solving the 
problem of a North Korea with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons.73  The 
imposition of sanctions and a willingness to work with the rogue country to 
provide aid in exchange for their agreement to cease and desist has been the 
hallmark of the United States’ diplomatic relations with North Korea.  Further, the 
United States and its ally South Korea continue to maintain strong defenses 
along the demilitarized zone (DMZ); periodic military exercises elicit complaints 
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from North Korean officials, but they generally seem accustomed to and 
accepting of the existing military situation.74 
 2. Player II – North Korea’s Strategies 
 a. Engage in diplomacy.  North Korea would benefit from engaging in 
negotiations and adhering to diplomatic solutions with the U.S. and other 
members of the Six Party Talks.  North Korea would receive a substantial 
humanitarian and economic aid package in addition to the removal of sanctions 
against the rogue country.  Further, diplomacy could be the first step toward a 
more favorable view of the country by the international community. 
 b. Develop and test long-range ballistic missiles despite agreements 
to the contrary.  North Korea hailed their missile tests of 2007 as a success, 
while Washington deemed the Taepodong II, at least, a failure.  As stated earlier, 
though, some United States analysts believe the tests were not designed to 
showcase the missiles’ full capability but instead to provide potential buyers with 
a limited demonstration.  If this is true, North Korea could accept the benefit from 
the Six Party Talks while covertly continuing its weapons program to sell it to 
others, threaten the United States and its allies, and/or renegotiate for better 
terms in the future. 
 3. Value Assessment of Combined Strategies 
AC – The United States enhances the current missile defense capabilities 
through its continued development and testing; North Korea engages in, and 
adheres to, diplomatic agreements to gain humanitarian and economic 
assistance.  In this scenario, the United States is giving up nothing and, 
therefore, is assigned the greatest payoff of 4.  In direct contrast, North Korea is 
giving up everything and, therefore, is assigned the lowest payoff of 1. 
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AD – The United States enhances the current missile defense capabilities 
through its continued development and testing; North Korea accepts the benefit 
of the Six Party Talks, but secretly continues to develop and test ballistic 
missiles.  Consequently, the United States and North Korea are both assigned a 
lower payoff of 2; the benefit to the United States is offset by the aid given to 
North Korea when it has not given up its weapons pursuits, and likewise, North 
Korea’s benefit is hindered by their clandestine agenda. 
BC – The United States continues to utilize diplomatic measures to 
maintain the status quo on the North Korean Peninsula and prevents the further 
proliferation of ballistic missiles by the rogue country; North Korea engages in, 
and adheres to, diplomatic agreements to gain humanitarian and economic 
assistance.  Consequently, the United States and North Korea are assigned a 
higher payoff of 3 because both countries are giving up something to receive a 
benefit. 
BD – The United States continues to utilize diplomatic measures to 
maintain the status quo on the North Korean Peninsula and prevent the further 
proliferation of ballistic missiles by the rogue country; North Korea accepts the 
benefit of the Six Party Talks, but secretly continues to develop and test ballistic 
missiles.  In this scenario, the United States is giving up something while 
receiving nothing in return, and is therefore assigned the lowest payoff of 1.  In 
direct contrast, North Korea is giving up nothing while receiving a benefit and is 
therefore assigned the greatest payoff of 4. 
 4. United State’s Supplementary Strategies 
It is important to emphasize that strategies “BC” and “BD” do not imply a 
complete lack of missile defense by the United States.  As discussed in Chapter 
3, Washington has already developed an operational ground-based capability in 
the Interceptors, PAC-3, and THAAD.  Further, the United States maintains 
active PAC-3 missile batteries in South Korea and Japan, and THAAD units are 
being developed and trained at Fort Bliss, Texas. 
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E. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA GAME   
Based on the assumptions and the strategies depicted for each of the two 
players, the game begins as depicted in the payoff matrix presented below in 
Figure 2.  As stated, both countries’ payoffs have been given independently to 
one another with 4 being the best and 1 being the worst.  Drawing on the 
Principle of Rationality, which emphasizes that every player wishes to come out 
as well off as possible, it is further assumed that each player will make decisions 
based solely on his or her payoffs.75  
  
Figure 2.   Illustration of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Figure 2 also illustrates the North Korean Missile Threat as a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.  A Prisoner’s Dilemma is a type of non-zero-sum game in which two 
players may each “cooperate” with or “defect” (i.e. betray) the other player, while 
putting their own interests first.  In the game’s classic form, cooperating is 
dominated by defecting, making the only possible equilibrium in the game occur 
when all players defect.76  In other words, no matter what the other player does, 
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one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect.  Given that playing 
“defect” is always more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play 
“defect”.  The unique equilibrium for Prisoner’s Dilemma is referred to as a 
Pareto-suboptimal solution, meaning that rational choice leads the two players to 
both play defect even though each player’s individual reward would be greater if 
they both played cooperate, hence the dilemma.77 
Furthermore, as a result of the expected payoffs illustrated in Figure 2, a 
Nash Equilibrium exists, indicating that neither player can freely improve their 
position unilaterally.  This is depicted with the implementation of Strategies A and 
D, where the United States enhances the current missile defense capabilities 
through its continued development and testing, while North Korea accepts the 
benefit of the Six Party Talks, but secretly continues to develop and test ballistic 
missiles (2,2).  Of note, though, is that this strategy of attack, where each player 
elects their most desired strategy, does not ensure that a higher payoff score is 
obtained.   
 1. Strategic Move Defined 
Although North Korea and the United States will want to play defect to 
attain the best benefit, their respective moves are not random but instead 
represent a strategic move.  A strategic move is designed to alter the beliefs and 
actions of others to attain a higher payoff.78  The distinguishing feature from this 
move and a random one is that the strategic move purposefully limits a player’s 
freedom of action because of its innate subterfuge.79   
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 2. Conducting a Strategic Move 
For North Korea to improve their payoff from the Nash Equilibrium of 2,2 
that is likely to occur without communication, they would need to promise the 
United States of their intention to abide by the Six Party Talks since it is in the 
best interest of both parties.  If North Korea is successful, both parties will move 
to the higher payoff of 3,3. However, if North Korea promised to continue 
engaging in diplomatic relations, then covertly continued to develop and test 
ballistic missiles, neither country would maintain the higher payoff of 3,3; a 1,4 
payoff in N.K. favor would then occur.   
For the United States to improve their payoff from the Nash Equilibrium of 
2,2 that is likely to occur without communication, they would need to promise 
North Korea that the current security measures are not a threat to them, and the 
adherence to the diplomatic solution agreed upon in the Six Party Talks will 
maintain the status quo, which is in the best interest of both countries.  If 
successful, the United States will improve their payoff to a 3,3.  However, if the 
United States promised to maintain the status quo, then covertly began 
developing new, more advanced technology for its missile defense program, 
neither country would maintain the higher payoff of 3,3; a 4,1 payoff in favor of 
the United States would then occur. 
For further illustrations of the players’ strategic moves with an in-depth 
analysis see APPENDIX B.  In addition, the players’ Security Values are depicted 
in APPENDIX C.  
F. CONCLUSION  
In reality, North Korea has much more to gain by reneging on its 
agreement then by keeping its word.  The United States has continued to utilize 
diplomacy when dealing with the rogue country rather than escalating the stakes 
with military action.  History continues to repeat itself until one party tires of the 
cycle.  The country that keeps giving – humanitarian aid, economic incentives, 
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and crude oil – is the United States, while North Korea keeps receiving.  The 
United States’ missile defense system, as capable as it is, has very little 
likelihood of deterring the rogue country from reneging on the agreements made 
in the Six Party Talks.  It will, however, deter them from launching a missile 
against the United States and its allies because the rogue country knows that the 
operational capabilities of the Ground-Based Interceptors, PAC-3, and THAAD 
will prevent completion.  Whether it happens next year or ten years from now, 
North Korea will once again show its ballistic missile and nuclear weapon hand.  
North Korea stands to gain more by forcing additional diplomatic concessions, 
than adhering to their word. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The game of ballistic missiles is truly high stakes; a miscalculation of the 
value of your cards or an unsuccessful bluff equals mass destruction.  The 
United States believes it has the upper hand.  More than $10 billion dollars a 
year is currently being spent to defuse the threat on the Peninsula caused by 
North Korea.  The layered defense system developed by the United States was 
designed to meet the SEDP’s effective needs statement of dismantling North 
Korea’s weapons program, but also deterring an offensive, and, if necessary, 
protecting our interests at home and abroad.   Consequently, the United States’ 
policy of diplomacy toward North Korea is shrouded in deterrence.   
The aim of the National Missile Defense Program is first to deter and 
second to protect.  The United States believes that by having a heavily funded, 
technologically advanced, and fully operational missile defense system in place, 
rogue countries like North Korea will think twice about spending their limited 
resources on ballistic missile and nuclear weapon proliferation.  However, in this 
respect the system has failed, for North Korea has not been deterred in its 
development of weapons of mass destruction.  Instead it has used its missile 
proliferation to acquire resources from the United States and other countries; the 
Six Party Talks of 2007 outline the most recent agreement.  Thus, the question 
becomes whether North Korea will be deterred from following its historic pattern 
of breaking promises to cease its weapons pursuits.   
The SEDP’s Value System Analysis determines if the United States’ 
missile defense system is capable of performing its designed function – to deter 
and to protect.  The system was designed to solve the problem of the North 
Korean Missile Threat, and thereby keep the United States and its interests safe 
from the rogue nation.  It answers the threat with consideration given to the 
phases of the missiles trajectory and its range.  The PAC-3 is a battle-proven 
component of the ground-based missile defense, and the Interceptors and 
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THAAD have both succeeded in intercepting missile targets during operational 
tests.  The analysis illustrates that the United States’ system is fully capable of 
deterring the rogue country from once again reneging on its agreement and 
resuming it weapons pursuits in a first step toward launching an attack against 
the United States.  However, the question of whether it will, in fact, act as a 
deterrent remains and ultimately decides the effectiveness of the United States’ 
Missile Defense System against the North Korean Missile Threat. 
Modeling provides an analytic framework utilizing Game Theory’s 
principles of strategy and risk calculation to illustrate what the likely outcome of 
this very dangerous game of ballistic missiles.  By first assigning payoff numbers 
to the United States’ strategies of missile defense and diplomacy and North 
Korea’s strategies of diplomacy and missile proliferation, the game proceeds to 
determine the likely outcome of the combined strategies.  The result of the 
gaming matrix is a Prisoner’s Dilemma, meaning that each party will elect to 
better themselves by betraying any promises made to the other party.  Given this 
scenario, the modeling analysis depicts a situation where the United States holds 
all the Aces, but North Korea has the trump card.  History will repeat itself; North 
Korea will once again renege on its agreements because they have everything to 
gain and little to lose, and when it occurs the United States will once again utilize 
diplomacy in an effort to defuse the North Korean Missile Threat. 
A. RECOMMENDATION 
The United States’ National Missile Defense System in itself is not an 
effective deterrent to the North Korean Missile Threat.  The United States need to 
up the ante.  North Korea believes the United States will continue to utilize 
diplomacy when dealing with them, and Washington has not provided credible 
persuasion to the contrary.  The SEDP has shown the system can perform as 
both a deterrent and a protective measure, but Game Theory shows that, in 
regards to North Korea, it simply won’t act as a deterrent.  To change the 
outcome, the United States must employ a different strategy by playing a card it 
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has thus far been unwilling to lay down – the next time North Korea readies its 
systems for a missile launch, test or otherwise, the United States must swiftly 
ready its systems for an intercept, whether it elects to follow through or not. 
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APPENDIX A.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSILE 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AS A DETERRENT TO THE NORTH 
KOREAN MISSILE THREAT. 
A. GAME THEORY TERMINOLOGY 
In comprehending the methodology described in this thesis, it is important 
to define certain terms that are used when applying game theory: 
1. The payoff matrix of a game is the matrix wherein each row 
corresponds to a strategy of a maximizing player, each column corresponds to a 
strategy of the minimizing player, and the matrix entry is the payoff resulting from 
the strategy choices of that row and column. 
2. Nash equilibrium, named after John Nash, is a set of strategies, 
one for each player, such that no player has incentive to unilaterally change their 
action.  Players are in equilibrium if a change in strategies by any one of them 
would lead that player to earn less than if the player remained with its current 
strategy. 
3. A simultaneous game is one in which all players make decisions or 
select a strategy without knowledge of the strategies that are being chosen by 
other players.  Even though the decisions may be made at different points in 
time, the game is simultaneous because each player has no information about 
the decisions of others; thus it as if the decisions are made simultaneously.  
Simultaneous games are represented by the normal formula and solved using 
the concept of a Nash equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX B.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSILE 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AS A DETERRENT TO THE NORTH 
KOREAN MISSILE THREAT. 
A. THE U. S. STRATEGIC MOVES 
 First Move: 
 If the U.S. makes the first move –The U.S. would choose A for an 
outcome of (2,2) 
 If The U.S. takes A, then N.K. takes D – giving outcome of 2,2 
 If The U.S. takes B, then N.K. takes D – giving outcome of 1,4 
 It does not benefit The U.S. to make the first move 
 Does THE U.S. have a threat? 
 The likely outcome is AD (2,2) 
 The U.S. wants C, puts threat on D 
 Threat if N.K. takes D, the U.S. takes B – giving outcome of 1,4 
 Normally if N.K. takes D, the U.S. takes A – giving outcome of 2,2 
 The new outcome does not benefit the U.S. but does help N.K.  
 The U.S. does not have a threat 
 Can the THE U.S. make a promise? 
 THE U.S. wants C, promises not to take B (eliminating BC) 
 Promise if N.K. takes C, the U.S. takes B giving 3,3 
 Normally if N.K. takes C, the U.S. takes A giving 4,1 
 This new outcome hurts the U.S. and benefits N.K. 
 The U.S. does have a promise 
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 Will the promise work alone? 
 If N.K. takes C, the U.S. takes B giving outcome of 3,3 
 If N.K. takes D, the U.S. takes A giving outcome of 2,2 
 The U.S. will choose B for an outcome of BC (3,3) 
 The promise will work alone.  If the U.S. can make the promise 
legitimate, it can improve both players’ outcome from AD (2,2) to BC (3,3). 
B. N.K. STRATEGIC MOVES 
 First Move: 
 If N.K. makes the first move – N.K. would choose D for an outcome 
of (2,2) 
 If N.K. takes C, then the U.S. takes A – giving outcome of 4,1 
 If N.K takes D, then the U.S. takes B – giving outcome of 2,2 
 It does not benefit N.K. to make the first move 
 Does N.K. have a threat? 
 The likely outcome is AD (2,2) 
 N.K wants B, puts threat on A 
 Threat if the U.S. takes A, N.K. takes C – giving outcome of 4,1 
 Normally if U.S takes A, N.K takes D – giving outcome of 2,2 
 The new outcome does not benefit N.K. but does help the U.S.  
 N.K. does not have a threat 
 Can the N.K. make a promise? 
 N.K. wants B, promises not to take D (eliminating BD) 
 Promise if the U.S. takes B, N.K. takes C giving 3,3 
 Normally if the U.S takes B, N.K. takes D giving 1,4 
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 This new outcome hurts N.K. and benefits the U.S. 
 N.K. does have a promise 
 Will the promise work alone? 
 If the U.S. takes A, N.K. takes D giving outcome of 2,2 
 If the U.S. takes B, N.K. takes C giving outcome of 3,3 
 N.K. will choose C for an outcome of BC (3,3) 
 The promise will work alone.  If N.K. can make the promise 
legitimate, it can improve both players’ outcome from AD (2,2) to BC (3,3). 
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APPENDIX C.  THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE U.S. MISSILE 
DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AS A DETERRENT TO THE NORTH 
KOREAN MISSILE THREAT. 
A. PLAYERS SECURITY VALUES 
Having determined that neither the U.S. nor N.K. can improve by 
unilaterally moving from its dominant strategy, it becomes essential to analyze 
each player’s game to determine if there is the possibility of improving an 
outcome by playing one player’s side.  Figures 1 and 2 show the result of both 
the U.S. and N.K. games.  In each game, the objective is for the player whose 
game is being analyzed to maximize its outcome while the opponent attempts to 
minimize the other player’s outcome.  The end result determines each player’s 
security value. 
 1. U.S. Game Options 
  U.S. objective – Maximize Outcome 
  N.K. objective – Minimize Outcome 













 2. N.K. Game Options 
  N.K. objective – Maximize Outcome 
  U.S. objective – Minimize Outcome 
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